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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court imposed a heightened 
burden on disparate impact plaintiffs. This burden requires 
 
 *  J. Reuben Clark Law School, J.D. 2020. Brigham Young University, B.S. 2015.  
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plaintiffs to prove that a state actor possessed a highly culpable 
mental state when creating a disparate impact. Accordingly, it is 
exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to prove their equal protection 
rights have been violated when the state action at issue is facially 
equal. Scholars have critiqued this heightened burden as being  
at odds with how bias operates2 and as frustrating the purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 These arguments amount to a call  
for the Court to correct course by lowering the bar for disparate  
impact plaintiffs. 
While the Court is uniquely positioned to respond to the 
disfavored constitutional doctrines it develops, waiting on  
the Court can be a dubious prospect. There is no guarantee  
that the Court will ever change course. The disparate impact 
plaintiff’s burden has now been in place for forty years. And as time 
passes without a change, the cases establishing the doctrine grow 
in stare decisis strength.4 Such enduring Court inaction makes 
exploring non-judicial responses to disfavored constitutional 
doctrines worthwhile. 
The alternative response considered in this Note is a 
congressional one. While congressional responses to constitutional 
doctrines do not change the doctrine, they can give constitutional 
doctrines fuller effect. That is, Congress can use its power to make 
additional law operative that complements the doctrine. This Note 
contends that Congress would be justified in using its powers 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass a statute explicitly 
making punitive damages available to plaintiffs that bring 
 
 2. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“[A] large part of the behavior that 
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.”). 
 3. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for You?: Addressing 
McCleskey v. Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the Constitutionally Significant Risk of 
Race Bias, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1301–02 (2018) (“What is wrong with the Court’s 
requirement of proof of discriminatory purpose? First, it misunderstands the purpose of the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause should protect 
against the discriminatory results of government actions and not just against the 
discriminatory motivations of government actors. In other words, the government should 
not be able to act in a manner that harms racial minorities, regardless of why it took  
the action.”). 
 4. Though, of course, stare decisis is less exacting in the constitutional context for the 
very reason that only the Court can say what the Constitution means. Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991). 
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successful disparate impact claims against state governments.5 
Congress would be justified in doing so because the heightened 
proof burdens imposed by the Court make successful disparate 
impact plaintiffs especially meritorious of the damages.  
The U.S. Code most nearly achieves what this Note suggests in 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 originated with the Civil Rights Acts 
of 18716 and grants a private right of action for money damages to 
individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by 
persons acting under color of state law.7 While § 1983 has been the 
basis for punitive awards against state and local officials,8 it does 
not create ordinary liability for states themselves. And City of 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.9 held that punitive damages were 
improper against a municipality in a § 1983 action in light of 
congressional intent and policy considerations (namely, 
punishment and deterrence).10 Punitive damages awards against 
states are thus all the more outside of § 1983’s ambit. Accordingly, 
the availability of punitive damages for disparate impact claims 
against states is dependent upon further congressional action. 
 
 5. This Note is not, strictly speaking, normative. It suggests that Congress would be 
justified in awarding punitive damages against the states but stops short of saying Congress 
should do so. This is because successful disparate impact plaintiffs are rare, perhaps 
nonexistent. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. This absence of successful plaintiffs 
means that legislatively providing for punitive damages would be largely symbolic—there 
is no one to award the damages. Whether Congress should enact a symbolic law raises 
practical considerations concerning the use of legislative resources. See Matthew C. 
Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and Judicial Manipulation of 
Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2008) (describing the opportunity costs of 
enacting even “relatively simple and uncontroversial” legislation). Assessing the symbolic 
value of providing for punitive damages against the states for disparate impact plaintiffs in 
light of these practical considerations is beyond the scope of this Note. Thus, this Note is 
limited to arguing that Congress would be justified in making the punitive award. 
 6. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (explaining § 1983’s origins). 
 7. The law reads, in pertinent part, 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C § 1983 (2018). 
 8. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 9. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 10. Id. at 258–71. 
6.STEWART_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
300 
 
The analysis begins in Part II with consideration of Congress’s 
power to award punitive damages against the states, a remedy that 
would typically violate state sovereign immunity. However, 
Congress has power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it 
acts pursuant to, and within the limitations on, its § 5 power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Next, Part III discusses the doctrine of 
disparate impact claims and punitive damages. This doctrinal 
discussion will facilitate the conclusion in Part IV that punitive 
damages awards may justifiably be extended to disparate impact 
plaintiffs because the legal and policy predicates to punitive 
damages are satisfied. Part V concludes.  
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AGAINST STATES 
Before assessing whether legislatively authorizing punitive 
awards against the states is justified, the antecedent inquiry is 
whether Congress has the power to make such an award. This 
initial inquiry runs through the Eleventh Amendment and 
Congress’s power to abrogate it under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Abrogation permitted, this Part also considers the constitutional 
dictates controlling the manner of abrogation. 
A. State Sovereign Immunity and the Abrogation Thereof 
The first obstacle confronting an argument that Congress may 
justifiably award punitive damages against the states is state 
sovereign immunity, codified in the Eleventh Amendment.11 Such 
a remedy would extend the judicial power of the United States to a 
suit in law between citizens and state governments. While the 
Supreme Court has never addressed whether Congress may 
provide a punitive damages remedy against the states, the Court 
has recognized other permissible incursions into state sovereign 
immunity. This Section briefly reviews the Eleventh Amendment’s 
contours and then addresses Congress’s power to abrogate them by 
virtue of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
 11. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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Following its adoption to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia,12 which 
held that federal courts could adjudicate suits between private 
citizens and states, the Eleventh Amendment has waxed and 
waned in potency.13 Initially interpreted narrowly, the Court read 
the Amendment to only prohibit suits in federal court where the 
diverse parties were the citizen(s) of one state and the government 
of another state.14 This narrow interpretation gave way in 1890 to 
the broad Hans v. Louisiana ruling that states could largely not be 
haled into federal court regardless of the basis of the jurisdiction or 
the identity of the parties.15 Hans immediately became the basis for 
an expansive understanding of state sovereign immunity.16 In just 
under a century, a state’s immunity to suit in federal court went 
from anemic to brawny.  
The Eleventh Amendment and Hans are ostensibly about 
sovereignty.17 The “indestructible states” have a sovereign status in 
our federal system that endures.18 A robust interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment respects the states’ refusal, as expressed by 
the Amendment, to be subjected to federal jurisdiction. But there is 
a tension to recognizing state sovereign immunity in our American 
system in light of federal law’s supremacy. Perhaps out of 
awareness of this tension, the Court has recognized certain 
 
 12. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 13. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 7–13 (1988). 
 14. Id. at 8–9. “Interpreted narrowly” in this context means simply following the text 
of the amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264, 348–49 (1821) (holding that a state was subject to the federal question jurisdiction of the 
federal courts when sued by one of its citizens). 
 15. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). While Hans defies a search for a definitive 
statement of its holding, its rejection of federal question jurisdiction for suits between a 
citizen of a state and the state does emerge from the opinion’s discussion of the longstanding 
immunity afforded sovereigns. Id. 
 16. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892) (citing Hans for the proposition  
that “the judicial power of the United States does not extend to suits of individuals  
against states”). 
 17. Other considerations, like the states’ inability to afford debt-related judgments 
rendered in federal court following the civil war, certainly were at play in Hans. See Jackson, 
supra note 13, at 9. 
 18. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869); see also Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 
918–19 (1997). 
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exceptions to the formal rule against the judicial power extending 
to suits by individuals against states.19  
One prominent class of exceptions deals with functional 
carveouts to sovereign immunity. These carveouts focus “efforts to 
avoid [the Amendment’s] application . . . [on] nam[ing] an officer 
and a form of relief that would not be regarded as within its 
scope.”20 Plaintiffs can evade sovereign immunity where (1) the 
defendant is a state officer who can be sued in his or her individual 
capacity for actions in violation of constitutional mandates and 
(2) the relief sought is injunctive and prospective.21 But if the nature 
of the action—by virtue of the defendant sued or the relief sought—
is such that the remedy would be paid from the state treasury, then 
the courts will deem the suit to be against the state and 
consequently barred by the Eleventh Amendment.22  
Another class of exceptions does not merely create a carveout 
to state sovereign immunity but rather sets the immunity aside 
entirely. Under the power granted it by § 5, the Court held in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that Congress may abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23 The Court stated, “Congress may, in determining 
what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits 
against States or state officials which are constitutionally 
impermissible in other contexts.”24 Thus while private plaintiffs 
must try to avoid the amendment’s application, Congress can 
legislate in direct contradiction of the amendment.25 As will be clear 
from the next section, the Court’s tight policing of the Fourteenth 
 
 19. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
 20. Id. at 11; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–65 (1974); Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123, 157–60 (1908). 
 21. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102–03 (1984). 
 22. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. 
 23. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 24. Id. A threshold question when reviewing exercises of § 5 power is whether the 
legislation concerns the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute suggested by 
this Note answers in the affirmative given the underlying problem the statute would address 
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 25. The Court does require that Congress make “its intention [to abrogate] 
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 
73 (2000) (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)). For purposes of this Note, an 
unmistakably clear intention to abrogate is assumed. 
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Amendment framework makes the § 5 exception to state sovereign 
immunity a narrow one. 
Fitzpatrick does not explicitly address whether Congress may 
make provision for punitive damages against the states pursuant to 
its § 5 power.26 But the language of the holding is broad, not 
admitting on its face of any such limitation. And, crucially, 
Fitzpatrick awarded money damages against state officers in their 
official capacity,27 a remedy in direct opposition to the established 
rule that the Eleventh Amendment bars judgments that are paid out 
of the state treasury. As judgment debits on the state treasury have 
always been the major line guarded by the Eleventh Amendment, 
it is not readily apparent that a punitive award would be 
invalidated for crossing that line while a compensatory award is 
upheld despite doing the same.28 Thus Congress has the power to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment and it is likely, on the authority 
of Fitzpatrick, that this power includes awarding punitive damages 
against the states.  
B. Remedial Legislation 
Caselaw since Fitzpatrick has emphasized that Congress must 
exercise its § 5 power within constitutional limits. Determining that 
Congress has the authority to abrogate sovereign immunity does 
not give Congress carte blanche. City of Boerne v. Flores29 is the 
 
 26. Consideration of the manner of abrogation (the punitive damages award) here 
may be superfluous in light of Section II.B’s discussion of the limitations on Congress’s § 5 
power. Fitzpatrick could be authority solely for congressional abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment with City of Boerne informing the manner of abrogation. But as the Court has 
never addressed the permissibility of a punitive award against the states made pursuant to 
§ 5, a brief consideration of whether Fitzpatrick, which predates City of Boerne, alone supports 
a punitive award against the states is not undue. 
 27. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447–50, 457. 
 28. There may be sound reasons to distinguish between compensatory and punitive 
awards for abrogation purposes. But the overriding constitutional concern has been whether 
the judgment will be paid from the state treasury. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 
513 U.S. 30, 51 (1994) (“[T]he prevailing view identif[ies] ‘the “state treasury” criterion—
whether any judgment must be satisfied out of the state treasury—as the most important 
consideration’ in resolving an Eleventh Amendment immunity issue.” (citation omitted)). 
The idea of a compensatory backstop in Eleventh Amendment doctrine for abrogation 
purposes—as in, the Amendment generally forbids judgments that will be paid from the 
state treasury but even when abrogated the Amendment forbids punitive judgments—is not 
suggested by the case law. 
 29. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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relevant authority restraining use of the § 5 power. This Section 
discusses the remedial requirement that City of Boerne imposed on 
§ 5 legislation. It also considers the proportionality and congruence 
limitations City of Boerne found to be central to proper § 5 
legislation. A statute awarding punitive damages pursuant to  
§ 5 must satisfy these parameters.  
City of Boerne was the last of the three major acts of the Free 
Exercise Clause drama of the 1990s. First, in 1990, Employment 
Division v. Smith sustained the denial of unemployment benefits 
under Oregon law to adherents of the Native American Church 
whose employment was terminated for sacramental peyote 
consumption.30 Declining to employ the then-prevailing Sherbert 
balancing test,31 the Court held that religious observance did not, 
standing alone, excuse non-compliance with a neutral law of 
general applicability (in Smith, the general ban on peyote 
consumption).32 Second, Congress responded with the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. It overturned Smith and 
restored the Sherbert test to all free exercise claims, consequently 
forbidding government at every level in the United States to 
substantially burden, even by neutral laws of general applicability, 
the free exercise of religion without satisfying Sherbert.33 Then came 
City of Boerne in 1997.  
The question presented was whether RFRA as applied to the 
states was a permissible exercise of Congress’s § 5 power.34 More 
precisely, the question was whether Congress had the power to 
substantively determine that the Free Exercise Clause, incorporated 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, required state 
and local governments to satisfy the Sherbert balancing test before 
burdening religious exercise.35 RFRA did not win the day. The 
Court held that Congress is not authorized by § 5 to substantively 
define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees.36 
 
 30. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 31. Id. at 884–85. Smith characterized Sherbert as requiring that “governmental actions 
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest.” Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963)). 
 32. Id. at 882. 
 33. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, §§ 2(a)–(b), 3(a), 
5(1), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4). 
 34. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511. 
 35. See id. at 516–17. 
 36. Id. at 519. 
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Such is the province of the Court. Rather, Congress is limited to 
remedially enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Observing that the line between the two can be hard to draw, 
the Court further found that unconstitutional substantive and 
constitutional remedial legislation are differentiated by requiring 
“a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”37 
Proportionality and congruence are a fit of degree38 and kind39 
between the legislation and the underlying problem. In City of 
Boerne, the Court found RFRA wanting with respect to 
proportionality as it broadly swept up all government action 
everywhere in perpetuity.40 Congress created in RFRA a statute 
that, to be proportional, would have required that free exercise be 
assailed from every quarter. As there was no evidence that such 
was the case, RFRA could not be remedial and thus had to be 
substantive and, accordingly, unconstitutional.41  
The statutory grant of punitive damages to disparate impact 
plaintiffs envisioned by this Note would be remedial legislation. 
The statute would rely upon a plaintiff satisfying the judicially 
determined burden of proof that the Equal Protection Clause had 
been violated as a basis for awarding the damages. This is in 
contrast to RFRA, which attempted to overturn a judicial 
determination—Smith—of what the Free Exercise Clause requires 
of states. And a disparate impact plaintiff would only have access 
to punitive damages upon a judicial adjudication that he or she met 
the judicially decreed burden. Such reliance on the judiciary for the 
constitutional standard and predicating the award on judicial 
resolution of the constitutional claim indicates the statute 
 
 37. Id. at 519–20. 
 38. Factors including “termination dates, geographic restrictions, [and] egregious 
predicates” are relevant to proportionality. Id. at 533. 
 39. A subsequent case indicated congruence (and proportionality) requires that the 
legislation be aimed at state, as opposed to private, action.  United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 625–26 (2000). In Morrison, the Violence Against Women Act was incongruent 
because it sought to remedy states’ public underenforcement of crimes of violence 
perpetrated against women by giving the victims a private civil remedy against their 
abusers.  Id. at 619–20, 626. 
 40. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (“RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed 
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”). 
 41. Id. at 534–35. 
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suggested here would not be a congressional attempt at substantive 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, Congress’s 
authorization of the punitive award would be a means appropriate 
to the end of remedying disparate impact violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
Congruence and proportionality, to the degree that they are 
necessary,42 are also satisfied. The punitive grant contemplated by 
this Note would only be available upon an adjudication that a state 
had unreasonably classified with a discriminatory purpose.43 The 
law would thus operate in a targeted fashion, allowing punitive 
damages in proportion to instances of unreasonable and highly 
culpable classification as plaintiffs successfully litigate them. 
Moreover, statutory provision of a damages remedy for 
constitutional claims is an accepted exercise of § 5 power.44 Using 
this accepted exercise of power to provide for punitive damages 
makes these plaintiffs a vehicle for punishing states for creating 
disparate impacts. By operating in this tailored fashion to address 
state violations of constitutional rights, a punitive award for 
disparate impact plaintiffs satisfies the proportionality and 
congruence requirements.  
Accordingly, Congress has the constitutional power to award 
punitive damages for disparate impact violations given that such 
an award would be a permissible abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity and would be remedial.  
III. DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE 
Having established that Congress has the power to provide 
punitive damages for plaintiffs bringing disparate impact claims 
against states, the analysis now inquires into the doctrines of 
disparate impact claims and punitive damages. Reviewing these 
 
 42. Congruence and proportionality are tools to ensure that exercises of § 5 power are 
remedial. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. If the legislation at issue, like that 
suggested in this Note, is not a close call on the remedial versus substantive question, then 
the analytical aid offered by congruence and proportionality is not needed. 
 43. See infra Sections III.A, IV.A.1. 
 44. Section 1983 is a prime example. See supra note 7; infra notes 102–04. The title of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871—“An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes”—makes clear that Congress 
passed the law pursuant to § 5. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), rev’d on other 
grounds, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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doctrines will frame the legal and policy arguments justifying the 
damages provision contemplated by this Note.  
A. Disparate Impact Claims 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause states 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”45 Thus, read literally, equal 
protection means a state cannot make classifications among citizens 
that distribute burdens or benefits inequitably. Now of course the 
state has to make some classifications that distribute burdens or 
benefits inequitably, otherwise state government would be 
hamstrung.46 (These classifications range from the innocuous—for 
example, an age classification for obtaining a driver’s license—to 
the controversial—for example, a race classification for admission 
to state institutions of higher education.) Accordingly, courts 
reviewing an Equal Protection Clause challenge have to ascertain 
whether the classification is reasonable.47  
Before inquiring into reasonableness, however, a reviewing 
court will ask whether the classification is on the face of the 
government action, that is, whether the action expressly classifies. 
For facially classificatory state actions, the plaintiff’s claim proceeds 
to the application of the tier of scrutiny (usually heightened or 
rational basis) commensurate with the classification’s 
reasonableness.48 A non-facially classificatory state action may still 
be unreasonable in operation, but the plaintiff’s claim first goes 
through a burden-shifting framework to determine whether the 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 46. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the 
practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting 
disadvantage to various groups or persons.”). 
 47. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1981) 
(recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not prevent the States from 
making reasonable classifications”). 
 48. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (applying heightened 
review to a state institution of higher education that by explicit provision only admitted 
men). 
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state action even classifies in the first place.49 Only if the  
claim survives this burden-shifting does it then proceed to the  
tiers of scrutiny.50 Use of a burden-shifting framework insulates 
non-facially classificatory actions from judicial scrutiny under the 
guise of a presumption of constitutionally valid state action.51 
Consequently, states have a freer hand to trench on equal 
protection and challenges to non-facially classificatory state 
actions—disparate impact claims—are harder to win than 
challenges to facially classificatory actions.  
The elements of the burden-shifting framework are taken in 
turn in the next three subsections. Three Supreme Court cases from 
the latter half of the 1970s are crucial to this framework. Washington 
v. Davis concerned a qualifying test for firemen that black 
applicants disproportionately failed.52 Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation dealt with a rezoning 
denial that frustrated low-income, black housing construction.53 
And Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney centered on a 
state public employment preference for veterans that routinely 
failed to benefit women.54 These cases are largely responsible  
for the modern framework of disparate impact claims and their 
proof requirements. 
1. Alleging a disparate impact 
The burden-shifting framework begins with the plaintiff 
alleging that a state action has had a disparate impact. But the 
allegation almost always plays a minor role in the burden-shifting 
framework. This owes in large part to the Court’s emphasis on the 
second part of the framework, the defendant’s discriminatory 
 
 49. The state action likely classifies in some fashion. See supra note 46. For example, an 
exam might facially classify (even amongst white examinees) on the basis of a passing exam 
score. But the burden-shifting analysis gets at whether a non-facial classification (black 
examinees scoring poorly as a group) can be said to classify at all. 
 50. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (demonstrating the analysis in the 
context of a non-facially classificatory redistricting plan). 
 51. See infra note 66. 
 52. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232–36 (1976). 
 53. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,  
255–59 (1977). 
 54. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 261–65 (1979). 
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purpose.55 Indeed, alleging the disparate impact is typically 
insufficient on its own to shift the burden of proof to  
the defendant.56  
The limited circumstance where an impact is extreme or 
irrational does allow the allegation of the disparate impact to take 
on an all-important role. Where the disparate impact is such that 
the state action can only be explained as motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose, the disparate impact itself is sufficient to 
switch the burden to the state-actor defendant.57 The Court has 
opined that such a circumstance is the rare exception to the general 
rule that the disparate impact does not switch the burden.58 The 
Court cites Yick Wo v. Hopkins59 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot60 as 
examples of this rare exception.61 Yick Wo involved a permit 
requirement in San Francisco that had been used to grant permits 
to all but one white applicant and to no Chinese applicant.62 
Gomillion was a redistricting case where Alabama redrew a square 
shaped city as “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” with the 
effect of excluding nearly all of its black voters from the boundaries 
without excluding a single white voter.63 The reference to these 
cases suggests that for this rare exception to apply, (almost) all 
similarly situated individuals within the state action’s ambit have 
to be impacted and (almost) no individuals outside this group  
may be impacted. But even when this exception applies, it does  
so only as a proxy for discriminatory purpose, the focus of the 
framework’s analysis.64  
 
 55. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law 
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, 
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 60. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 61. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 62. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357–59. 
 63. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 339–40. 
 64. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“It is also clear from the 
cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion 
of Negroes is itself such an ‘unequal application of the law . . . as to show intentional 
discrimination.’” (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945))). 
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2. Proving discriminatory purpose 
Having alleged that the state action results in a disparate 
impact, the plaintiff must then prove that the state acted with a 
discriminatory purpose to cause the disparate impact.65 This 
burden is designed to be demanding. The Court attaches a 
presumption of validity to non-facially classificatory actions out of 
respect for the decisions made by state governments.66 A heavy 
burden on the plaintiff in the form of a presumptively valid state 
action also has the formalistic convenience of foreclosing inquiry 
behind the neutral face of a state action unless compelling reasons 
exist to so inquire.67  
The Court has consistently formulated “discriminatory 
purpose” as the kind of motive or mental state that the disparate 
impact plaintiff must prove the state possessed. Feeney gave 
discriminatory purpose its most definitive—and, for plaintiffs, 
devastating—gloss. There the Court threw cold water on the 
petitioner’s argument, “common to the criminal and civil law, that 
a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his 
voluntary actions.”68 As discriminatory purpose “implies more 
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences[,]” 
Feeney required the plaintiff to prove that the state action was taken 
“because of,” not merely “in spite of,” the disparate impact.69 One 
scholar has observed of Feeney that “the Court asked plaintiffs to 
prove that legislators adopting a policy that would foreseeably 
injure women or minorities had acted with the express purpose of 
 
 65. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). 
 66. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 
259, 272–73 (1977) (noting that there is a “presumption of constitutionality to which every 
duly enacted state and federal law is entitled”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 
1291 (2011) (“[G]overnment actions not containing racial classifications . . . [do] not provoke 
the presumption of unconstitutionality, even if such facially neutral policies tend[] to bear 
more harshly on one group than another.”). 
 67. The Court’s response to the disparate impact in Davis is illuminating. 
As an initial matter, we have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a 
racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially 
discriminatory and denies ‘any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply 
because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other 
racial or ethnic groups. 
Davis, 426 U.S. at 245. 
 68. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278. 
 69. Id. at 279. 
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injuring women or minorities—in short, a legislative state of mind 
akin to malice.”70  
As of 2012, not a single plaintiff since Feeney had proved that a 
state had acted with discriminatory purpose.71 As result, the exact 
line dividing discriminatory purpose after Feeney and lesser 
motives cannot be precisely determined, or at least common law 
reasoning is not available to ascertain it. This paucity of successful 
plaintiffs, however, is suggestive of the relative height of the 
discriminatory purpose standard. While discriminatory purpose’s 
absolute height is unknown, it is more demanding than what forty 
years of disparate impact plaintiffs have argued it is.72  
The change Feeney wrought in the evidence that will discharge 
the plaintiff’s burden further suggests the relative height of the 
discriminatory purpose standard. This is so because “[t]he debate 
over proof is only roughly separable from the question of what 
counts as a discriminatory purpose.”73 Davis said discriminatory 
purpose “may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant 
facts.”74 Arlington Heights then enumerated some “relevant facts.” 
The disparate impact itself, though insufficient to satisfy the 
standard, was a useful starting point.75 Further avenues to proving 
discriminatory purpose included the historical background of the 
decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision, 
departures from the normal procedural or substantive sequence, 
and the legislative or administrative history.76 In short, under Davis 
and Arlington Heights, contextual evidence drawn from the 
circumstances surrounding the state action was probative of 
discriminatory purpose.  
 
 70. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 71. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2012). 
Professor Haney-López’s assertion is unfortunately bare. He cites no empirical data set nor 
describes any search methodology that allow him to state that there have not been any 
successful disparate impact claims since Feeney. 
 72. This Note does not present data for the number of disparate impact claims  
since Feeney. But there have been some disparate impact claims in the last forty years.  
See infra note 79. 
 73. Haney-López, supra note 71, at 1796. 
 74. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 75. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
 76. Id. at 267–68. 
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Feeney’s take on discriminatory purpose amounted to a 
rejection of the sufficiency of contextual evidence to prove 
discriminatory purpose and, commensurately, a heightening of  
the standard.77 As an initial matter, that Feeney changed 
discriminatory purpose is evident from the language of the 
opinion. Feeney’s requirement that but for the disparate impact the 
state would not have taken the challenged action is in direct 
opposition to Arlington Heights’ finding that “[r]arely can it be said 
that a legislature . . . made a decision motivated solely by a single 
concern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or 
‘primary’ one.”78 In light of this change, the Court after Feeney, 
finding discriminatory purpose satisfied only by a but-for motive 
and rejecting the “natural and foreseeable consequences” of a state 
action to prove it, required plaintiffs to provide direct evidence of 
discriminatory purpose.79 Scholarly commentary on the 
discriminatory purpose standard after Feeney has observed that 
“with only slight hyperbole one might say that the contemporary 
malice standard seems to demand a sworn affidavit admitting to 
discrimination, or perhaps even a confession in open court.”80 
In sum, discriminatory purpose is a but-for mental state, 
provable only by direct evidence of a state actor’s subjective motive. 
And, for what it is worth in understanding the standard, possibly 
no disparate impact plaintiff has yet proved that a state acted with 
discriminatory purpose in causing a disparate impact. 
 
 77. This is Professor Haney-López’s argument. Haney-López, supra note 71, at 1825–
26 (observing that Feeney was a departure point for the eventual understanding that 
discriminatory purpose “necessitat[ed] direct proof of actual mindsets”). 
 78. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. Arlington Heights was therefore concerned  
with discriminatory purpose when it became a “motivating factor” in the state’s decision.  
Id. at 266. 
 79. E.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298–99 (1987) (refusing to infer 
discriminatory purpose on the part of Georgia in its racially disparate capital sentencing 
system due to legislative discretion and the existence of some legitimate reasons for the 
system); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71–74 (1980) (rejecting contextual evidence of 
discrimination in a municipality’s electoral system as insufficient proof of discriminatory 
purpose). These cases do not explicitly call for direct evidence of individual state actor’s 
subjective state of mind. But it is challenging to conceive of anything less than that satisfying 
discriminatory purpose given the cases’ rejection of contextual evidence. 
 80. Haney-López, supra note 71, at 1790. 
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3. Lawful motivation 
Provided that the plaintiff successfully proves discriminatory 
purpose, the burden then shifts to the state defendant. The precise 
contours of this burden are uncertain. Davis quotes a jury selection 
case as requiring the state to “rebut the presumption of 
unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially 
neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced [a] 
monochromatic result.”81 But Feeney is silent as to burden shifting. 
And given the fatality of the discriminatory purpose standard to 
plaintiffs, this ultimate burden on the state is largely theoretical—
the analysis does not reach this stage.  
Whatever the burden, if the state successfully discharges it, then 
the state will be deemed to have not possessed a discriminatory 
purpose and the plaintiff’s action will fail. If, on the other hand, the 
defendant does not disprove that the disparate impact was the but-
for motivation of the state action, the case will proceed to 
application of the tier of scrutiny commensurate with the disparate 
impact’s reasonableness.  
*** 
In review, to clear the burden-shifting hurdles prior to 
application of a tier of scrutiny, a disparate impact plaintiff must 
allege that the disparate impact exists, prove that the state action 
was taken with the intention of causing the disparate impact to 
occur, and survive the state actor’s contrary proof that the state 
action resulted from a lawful motivation.  
B. Punitive Damages 
 Punitive, or exemplary,82 damages can be a species of common 
or statutory law.83 They go beyond the damages necessary to make 
 
 81. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)). 
 82. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, §§ 1.3, 2.1(A) (7th ed. 2015). 
 83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018) (providing for treble damages for violations of 
antitrust laws); Plains Res., Inc. v. Gable, 682 P.2d 653, 664–65 (Kan. 1984) (allowing for 
punitive damages as a remedy in tort law). Treble damages are not classic punitive damages 
in that the jury, as finder of fact, lacks discretion to determine the amount, but they are still 
punitive in nature. See SCHLUETER, supra note 82, § 2.0. 
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a plaintiff whole and are thus extra-compensatory.84 In their 
modern iteration they are largely justified on punishment and 
deterrence grounds85 and, when not set by statute, their 
determination is a matter for the judge or jury as finder of fact.86 
Most importantly for present purposes, the legal predicates to 
awarding punitive damages typically consist of mental state and 
serious misconduct requirements.87  
1. Mental state  
The mental state and serious misconduct requirements operate 
together to justify the award of punitive damages, which 
justification is necessary in light of the remedy’s extra-
compensatory nature. But while a mental state is typically predicate 
to a punitive award, punitive damages law does not have its own 
finely graded and consistently applied mental states framework.88 
Rather, punitive damages law borrows from a generalized law of 
mental states. Accordingly, this Note has selected two sources to 
inform its analysis. 
First, this Note will employ the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) 
mental states framework for purposes of assessing in Section IV.A.1 
the amenability of disparate impact claims to a punitive damages 
award. The MPC framework is divided into a hierarchy of four 
mental state gradations—purposely, knowingly, recklessly, 
negligently—with purposely being the most culpable and 
negligently the least.89 The use of the MPC framework, a criminal 
law mens rea framework, is a rational choice given punitive 
damages’ quasi-criminal nature.90  
 
 84. SCHLUETER, supra note 82, § 1.4(B). 
 85. Id. § 2.2(A)(1). 
 86. Id. § 1.3(A). 
 87. See DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES 315 (3d ed. 2018). 
 88. There is, at minimum, no general constitutional or statutory regime governing the 
mental state predicate for punitive damages. While the Due Process Clauses do bear on the 
mental state predicate via the reprehensibility concept, see infra note 107, it is unlikely that 
the Due Process Clauses are controlling when Congress legislates pursuant to § 5. See infra 
note 119. 
 89. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 90. See infra note 129. In addition to being rational, the MPC’s explicit hierarchical 
ranking of mental states makes its framework helpful as a comparison tool. See infra notes 
109–11 and accompanying text. 
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Second, this Note will utilize the mental state requirement for 
punitive damages under § 1983, as the Court discussed it in Smith 
v. Wade. As § 1983 is the statute most similar to what this Note 
proposes, its mental state requirement provides an opportunity to 
examine how the punitive award suggested here comports with the 
state of mind Congress has previously found to be sufficiently 
egregious for state deprivations of constitutional rights. Although 
§ 1983 does not directly address the necessary mental state for 
punitive damages, the Court (with Justice Brennan writing for the 
majority) took up the very subject in Wade.91 In response to the 
petitioner-defendant’s argument that actual intent was the 
standard under § 1983,92 the Court held that “evil motive or intent, 
or . . . reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected 
rights of others” satisfied the mental state requirement.93 Thus 
under § 1983 intent is a sufficient but not a necessary mental state.  
In a spirited dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist took umbrage at the 
Wade majority’s efforts to divine the 1871 Congress’s intent with 
regard to punitive damages.94 Rehnquist concluded actual intent is 
the proper standard for punitive damages under § 1983.95 Justice 
O’Connor, in her Wade dissent, looked to the purposes underlying 
§ 1983.96 Finding the compensatory purpose satisfied by ordinary 
money damages, she opined that the deterrence purpose of the law 
did not militate in favor of a less-than-intent standard given the 
potential for interference with officials’ duties.97 
While the debate on display in Wade is ultimately moot for 
purposes of this Note,98 canvassing the opinions highlights that all 
three posit intent (or malice) as the highest possible mental state 
requirement that § 1983 could impose as a predicate for punitive 
damages. The 1871 Congress, according to the Court, set a reckless 
 
 91. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 (1983). 
 92. Id. at 38. 
 93. Id. at 56. 
 94. Id. at 65–68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 68–84. Rehnquist asserted that a number of considerations— 
punitive damages being disfavored in the law, § 1983 not explicitly referring to punitive 
damages, federalism—weighed in favor of the “intent standard,” which is more restrictive.  
Id. at 84–92. 
 96. Id. at 92–93 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 93–94. 
 98. See infra Section IV.A. 
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threshold for punitive damages under § 1983, but a modern 
Congress could require no more than intent. Thus, the discussion 
of the mental state standard in Wade and the hierarchical ranking of 
the MPC’s mens rea gradations confirm that there is an upper bound 
to mental states that intent and purpose orbit.99 
2. Serious misconduct 
In order for punitive damages to be warranted, the sufficiently 
culpable mental state must lie at the root of serious misconduct.100 
The intuition is straightforward: extra compensatory remedies are 
only appropriate in response to extraordinarily deviant behavior. 
Case law highlights at least two factors relevant to the serious 
misconduct predicate—community standards of morality and due 
process considerations.  
Where a cause of action does not explicitly address the severity 
of the misconduct that will trigger an award of punitive damages, 
it preserves the jury’s traditional role in determining whether the 
challenged conduct is sufficiently abhorrent to merit the imposition 
of punitive damages. Section 1983 falls into this category. The Court 
described this jury determination as a “discretionary moral 
 
 99. The discussion of mental states in this Section does not reckon with the many 
critiques of mental state inquiries, from their obscurity, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: 
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99 
(1971) (describing legislative motive as “one of the most muddled areas of our constitutional 
jurisprudence”), to their propriety, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Ricci v. DeStefano: Even Whites Are 
a Protected Class in the Roberts Court, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 581–82 (2012) (discussing 
how an intent standard “rais[es] issues as to . . . why . . . a competent actor’s mental state 
(‘subjective intent’) rather than the effects of his deliberate (non-accidental) act should 
determine the act’s legal consequences”). Moreover, this Section and Section IV.A.1’s 
equating of various mental states are susceptible to criticism as conclusory for failing to 
engage the nuance in mental state law. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 
B.U. L. REV. 463, 466 (1992) (suggesting ways in which the “reigning hierarchy” of mental 
states is both “too simplistic” and “all too accurate[]”). However, these shortcomings are not 
germane to this Note’s purpose, which is to demonstrate that Congress would be justified in 
making punitive damages available to disparate impact plaintiffs. This Note takes as a given 
the mental state requirement disparate impact plaintiffs face, warts and all, and in light of 
that requirement’s extremity does not spend time parsing the boundless varieties of mental 
state formulations. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 100. Wade, 461 U.S. at 52 (describing the finder of fact’s determination as to the 
suitability of punitive damages as a step separate from and in addition to the state of mind 
inquiry); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (“Under the traditional 
common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award is initially determined by a jury 
instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong . . . .”). 
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judgment.”101 Juries and judges have exercised this moral judgment 
to award, and appellate courts have upheld, punitive damages in a 
variety of § 1983 cases, including where guards at a correctional 
facility made cell assignments that resulted in an assault,102 police 
officers went beyond a warrant in searching a property,103 and a 
state penitentiary segregated cell assignments by race.104 These 
cases illustrate that finders of fact making “discretionary moral 
judgment[s]” have determined violations of constitutional rights to 
be sufficiently serious to merit the imposition of punitive damages.  
In addition to the finder of fact’s discretion, the Due Process 
Clause also informs the severe misconduct predicate. Indeed, the 
Clause typically serves to impose limits on the finder of fact’s 
discretion, particularly as it relates to the amount of the punitive 
award.105 The Due Process Clause dictates that conduct be 
sufficiently egregious in order to merit a particular quantum of 
punitive damages. And the Supreme Court employs the concept of 
reprehensibility to determine whether the punitive award is 
excessive.106 Reprehensibility itself turns on such factors as 
“whether[] the harm caused was physical as opposed to 
economic; . . . the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; 
[and] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident . . . .”107 By influencing the quantum of damages juries may 
 
 101. Wade, 461 U.S. at 52. 
 102. Id. at 32–34. 
 103. Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1314–16 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 104. Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 105. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“[I]t is well 
established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on [punitive 
damages] awards. . . . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments . . . .”); EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 
513 F.3d 360, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that the same due process limitations on punitive 
damages under the Fourteenth Amendment against states are operative under Fifth 
Amendment against the federal government). 
 106. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of 
a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” 
(quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996))). 
 107. Id. Unfortunately the court also posits whether the conduct “evinced an indifference 
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others . . . and the harm was the result of 
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident[,]” as pertinent to reprehensibility, 
which unhelpfully blends the mental state and serious misconduct predicates.  
Id. (emphasis added). Ideally, the concept of reprehensibility would only concern conduct,  
not mental state. 
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award, these reprehensibility factors, and thus the Due Process 
Clause, operate to heighten the seriousness of the misconduct that 
is required for an award of punitive damages.  
IV. AWARDING DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMANTS  
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Having established the doctrinal frameworks of punitive 
damages and disparate impact claims, the analysis now applies the 
one to the other. Such application is the heart of this Note. As a 
matter of the legal principles involved, successful disparate impact 
plaintiffs present a compelling case for access to punitive damages. 
This Part also considers the policy bases for providing the punitive 
damages award. 
A. The Legal Aspects of Providing Punitive Damages to Disparate 
Impact Claimants 
Organizing the legal application around the predicates to 
punitive damages focuses the inquiry on two questions. First, does 
the discriminatory purpose showing required of disparate impact 
plaintiffs present a sufficiently culpable mental state to merit 
punitive damages? Second, does a disparate impact claim meet the 
serious misconduct standard for punitive damages? Answering 
these questions in light of the doctrines discussed in Part III reveals 
that a successful disparate impact plaintiff has, by carrying the 
burden of proof, met the standards for awarding punitive damages. 
1. Discriminatory purpose and the mental state predicate 
Discriminatory purpose is a sufficiently culpable mental state 
to satisfy the punitive damages mental state predicate. This is so 
whether Congress examines discriminatory purpose for 
satisfaction of a lesser mental state threshold—for example, the 
same reckless or callous indifference standard that controls the 
award of punitive damages in § 1983 cases—or the most 
heightened mental state.  
As a matter of plain meaning, any mental state formulation 
based on purpose is more heightened than a mental state 
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formulation based on recklessness.108 And while the cases do not 
directly compare recklessness and discriminatory purpose, a proxy 
for recklessness can be found in the disparate impact cases—the 
disparate impact itself. Recall that the allegation of the disparate 
impact alone fails to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden. If all that a state 
does is disregard the risk that its action will operate unequally upon 
different classes of people—as in, act recklessly—then the fact that 
a disparate impact has occurred is unavailing. A state action only 
classifies, and thus potentially violates the Equal Protection Clause, 
if the state acted with discriminatory purpose, the subjective goal 
of causing the disparate impact. Analogizing the disparate impact 
to recklessness therefore allows for the conclusion that 
discriminatory purpose is a more heightened mental state showing 
than recklessness.  
Where discriminatory purpose stands in relation to a lower 
mental state threshold, like § 1983’s recklessness standard, is 
inapposite given that discriminatory purpose satisfies even the 
most heightened mental state requirement. Utilizing the Model 
Penal Code’s (MPC) mens rea hierarchy confirms this conclusion. 
The purposely mental state, the hierarchy’s most culpable, is the 
“conscious object to engage in conduct of [a given] nature or to 
cause [a given] result.”109 Feeney requires that the state, in taking a 
facially neutral action, had the conscious object to work a 
discriminatory purpose. Thus, Feeney’s requirement that the state 
action be taken “because of” the disparate impact means that 
discriminatory purpose fits comfortably within purposely’s bounds.  
Perhaps the clearest comparison of mental states, however, 
involves the MPC’s knowingly mental state. This comparison 
leverages the employment of identical terms in the MPC and 
 
 108. The difficulties of mental state inquiries notwithstanding, the author is aware of 
no mental state hierarchy that ranks recklessness as equal to, much less more heightened 
than, purpose. Compare Reckless, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Characterized 
by the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious 
(and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk . . . .”),  
with Discriminatory Purpose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A design or desire  
to restrict the rights of a class of people, esp. a protected class.”). Recklessness is only 
conscious or deliberate with regard to an indifference to the risk of adverse consequences 
while the adverse consequences (the disparate impact) are the design or desire of 
discriminatory purpose. 
 109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
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Feeney. In Feeney, the Court observed that discriminatory purpose 
is more than “awareness of consequences.”110 The MPC, for its part, 
states that a “person acts knowingly . . . if . . . he is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause” a certain result.111 
Given how little daylight there is between purposely and 
knowingly in the MPC hierarchy,112 Feeney’s rule that 
discriminatory purpose is more than “awareness of consequences” 
necessarily puts discriminatory purpose on the same level  
as purposely.  
A final comparison, this time with § 1983, further demonstrates 
discriminatory purpose’s nature as an apex mental state. 
Discriminatory purpose is of a piece with the dissent’s argument in 
Wade that the proper mental state requirement under § 1983 is 
“intent to do injury.”113 An exact ordering of Feeney’s “because of” 
and Wade’s “intent to do injury” may be impossible. But that the 
two are likely equivalents is supported by their proponents’ 
understanding of the rationale behind such heightened 
requirements; namely, that punitive damages should rarely be 
granted114 and disparate impact claims should rarely be 
successful.115 If the majority in Feeney and the dissent in Wade 
understood themselves to be articulating the most restrictive 
mental state requirements for disparate impact claims and punitive 
damages under § 1983, respectively, then it stands to reason that 
they were articulating the same standard. 
There is no more demanding showing of mental state than what 
the Court has already required of disparate impact plaintiffs. Congress 
should accordingly feel confident that disparate impact plaintiffs have 
met the mental state predicate for awarding punitive damages. 
 
 110. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (emphasis added). 
 112. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (noting the “limited distinction 
between knowledge and purpose” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
445 (1978))). 
 113. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 70 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Wade dissent 
also uses the term “malice” to describe the mental state requirement it understands § 1983 to 
impose for punitive damages. Id. at 68. Notably, scholarly commentary also uses the “malice” 
term to describe the discriminatory purpose standard after Feeney. See supra notes 70, 80 and 
accompanying text. 
 114. Wade, 461 U.S. at 87–88. 
 115. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
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2. Disparate impact and the serious misconduct predicate 
Assessing disparate impacts under the serious misconduct 
requirement is more qualitative and less formulaic than the mental 
state requirement analysis. Serious misconduct analysis invokes 
the finder of fact’s discretion. In the context of this Note, Congress 
is the “finder of fact,” operating in an anticipatory manner in 
assessing whether the seriousness of a disparate impact ever merits 
the award of punitive damages.116 Discretion notwithstanding, 
Congress is not likely to affect a complete departure from the 
principles of fairness and community norms of morality that have 
guided courts and juries thus far in determining the contemptibility 
of conduct. And Congress can be assured that state action creating 
a disparate impact satisfies these principles and standards.  
The Constitution’s disdain for violations of equal protection rights 
is a key indicator of how seriously disparate impacts transgress 
principles of fairness and morality. While it is easy to lose sight of the 
severity of a disparate impact in light of the Court’s focus on 
discriminatory purpose, a disparate impact is the same, for 
constitutional purposes, when discriminatory purpose is present as a 
facial classification. Thus, disparate impact classifications are exactly 
what the plain language of the Equal Protection Clause forbids, only 
all the more contemptible for hiding under the cover of neutral, 
legitimate governing. Accordingly, disparate impacts caused by a 
discriminatory purpose fall within the unreasonable classifications to 
which the Constitution metes out serious treatment.117 Juries, 
exercising their moral discretion, have followed the Constitution’s 
 
 116. When Congress authorizes a punitive damages award it makes a determination 
regarding the seriousness of the conduct at issue analogous to the discretionary moral 
judgment that juries make when awarding punitive damages. Congress simply makes the 
judgment ex ante, not in the context of a lawsuit. And Congress’s ex ante judgments are of 
various amplitudes. Sometimes punitive damages automatically accompany a victory on the 
merits. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018). In other instances, they are simply available, 
preserving a role for the jury or judge as finder of fact while ensuring the possibility of the 
punitive award for deserving plaintiffs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1) (2018). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (“[C]lassifications may 
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women.” (citation omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (“[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by 
any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and central 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious 
racial discrimination in the States.”). 
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lead by awarding punitive damages against state officials where 
constitutional rights are attacked.118 As officers of the United States 
under oath to uphold the Constitution, Congress members should 
similarly look to our nation’s charter in assessing whether disparate 
impacts are sufficiently serious to merit punitive damages. 
Turning to due process considerations reveals a less stinging 
but still complete rebuke of disparate impact violations as 
constituting severe misconduct.119 The reprehensibility factors 
discussed in Section III.A.2 look to whether the misconduct was 
repeated, how vulnerable (financially) the plaintiff was, and the 
nature of the harm suffered.120 These factors will vary from case to 
case, which in itself may argue in favor of at least making the 
damages available even if not mandatory, but disparate impacts 
often present compelling bases for finding the misconduct was 
serious. Disparate impact claims have alleged repeated121 economic 
harm122 to disadvantaged individuals.123 The harm suffered may 
also be dignitary in nature.124 Consequently, Due Process Clause 
considerations argue in favor of finding disparate impact violations 
to be serious misconduct. 
The Equal Protection Clause, due process principles, and 
community norms all support a finding that disparate impact 
 
 118. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 119. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not likely 
binding on Congress in its exercise of § 5 power. As the Fourteenth Amendment’s  
Due Process Clause is a protection for individuals from state power, it is difficult to see how 
it could also be a protection for states from federal power. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause is a protection for individuals but from federal power. Nonetheless, the 
Clauses may well inform, even though they do not constrain, Congress. The concerns of 
reviewing courts—namely, that a lack of procedural safeguards will lead to an “arbitrary 
deprivation of property[,]” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 
(2003) (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994))—will likely influence 
Congress because exercises of § 5 power affect the Congress members’ home states.  
Accordingly, the principles undergirding the serious misconduct predicate in the traditional 
punitive damages context, including that the conduct be reprehensible under the Due 
Process Clauses, likely set a floor beneath which Congress would not go in defining conduct 
serious enough to merit punitive damages. 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 121. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232–36 (1976) (numerous black applicants 
failing test). 
 122. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 261–65 (1979) (deprivation of public 
employment preference). 
 123. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255–59 
(1977) (low-income housing rezoning denied). 
 124. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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violations amount to serious misconduct, or at minimum have the 
capacity to be serious misconduct. This support all indicates  
that Congress should view disparate impact violations as the  
kind of serious misconduct that justifies making punitive  
damages available. 
B. The Policy Aspects of Providing Punitive Damages to Disparate 
Impact Claimants 
Despite the strong legal arguments for allowing plaintiffs in 
disparate impact cases to seek punitive damages against states, 
punitive damages are non-mandatory in nature. Plaintiffs do not 
have a right to punitive damages.125 The award of such damages is 
traditionally, and often still, a matter for the discretion of the jury, 
subject to certain limitations.126 Moreover, punitive damages are 
highly disfavored—likely because they are a windfall beyond what 
is necessary to compensate the plaintiff.127 Accordingly, the 
consideration of policy factors in this Section gets at the question of 
whether providing punitive damages for disparate impact 
plaintiffs is a good idea.  
The primary policy justifications for awarding punitive 
damages are punishment and deterrence.128 These justifications are 
in keeping with punitive damages’ nature as “quasi-criminal.”129 
They are also in keeping with, or perhaps are necessitated by, the 
fact that punitive damages are extra compensatory; they award a 
plaintiff beyond what is necessary to make the plaintiff whole.130 
 
 125. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (“Punitive 
damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive full 
compensation for their injuries—but no more.”). 
 126. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.  v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). 
 127. See Wade, 461 U.S. at 59 (1983). 
 128. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) 
(describing punitive damages as “‘private fines’ intended to punish the defendant and deter 
future wrongdoing”). 
 129. Wade, 461 U.S. at 59 (quoting Huber v. Teuber, 10 D.C. (3 MacArth.) 484, 590 
(1877)). In criminal law, punishment is a state-imposed deprivation for which retribution and 
deterrence are justifications. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 33–34 (7th ed. 2016). 
 130. It is probably more accurate to say that punitive damages are extra compensatory 
because they award a plaintiff beyond what the compensatory damages determination says 
will make the plaintiff whole. It is impossible to determine what, if anything, will make some 
 
6.STEWART_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:1 (2020) 
324 
 
The law is willing, sometimes begrudgingly, to give a plaintiff more 
than he or she “deserves” because the award is accomplishing other 
ends. The punishment and deterrence justifications for punitive 
damages apply with force to disparate impact claims because of the 
insidious nature of disparate impact violations.  
1. Punishment 
Punishment in the punitive damages sense likely draws 
meaning from both retributivism and the notion that punishment 
provides an opportunity for society to express outrage at the 
wrongdoer.131 Criminal law’s retributivism is entirely self-fulfilling; 
that is, retributivism “is a nonconsequentialist justification of 
punishment. It is the claim that what makes the practice of 
punishment morally permissible is that criminals deserve 
punishment . . . .”132 It looks to no other end than imposition of the 
adverse consequence to the wrongdoer. Relatedly, punishment as 
a vindication of a violated community norm provides a channel for 
society to express its dissatisfaction with the misconduct.133 While 
other ends, principally social control, may flow from punishment, 
it is not imposed to achieve those ends. The goal is commensurate 
retribution and expression of outrage, not effective incentivization.  
Given the foregoing, the application of punitive damages to 
disparate impact claims is justified on punishment grounds. There 
is the commission of a wrong worthy of punishment—the disparate 
impact—and a defendant on whom society’s outrage may be 
expressed—the state entity. While the punishment rationale does 
justify the availability of punitive damages for disparate impact 
 
plaintiffs whole. Indeed, some authorities have reasoned that the difficulty in assessing 
compensable harm is a factor that militates in favor of a greater punitive damages award.  
See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 131. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive 
Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2075 (1998) 
(“[P]unitive damages may have a retributive or expressive function, designed to embody 
social outrage at the actions of serious wrongdoers.”). Some authorities roll retributivism 
and expression of societal outrage into one, see id. at 2085–86, while others draw a sharp line 
between them; see Smothers v. Alaska, 579 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Alaska 1978) (“The support of 
community expectations that existing norms will be enforced and delicts will be punished is 
separate from retribution.”). 
 132. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1626 (1992). 
 133. See Sunstein et al., supra note 131, at 2085 (“Juries believe that such [punitive 
damages] awards express the community’s outrage at certain forms of behavior . . . .”). 
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claims, it likely also justifies punitive damages for all claims that 
meet the legal predicates for awarding the damages.134 Such a fact 
limits the potency of the punishment rationale as an independent 
justification for awarding punitive damages. But the suitability of 
the punishment justification to other claims does not diminish its 
suitability to disparate impact claims, where the defendant has 
been proven to have an especially condemnable mental state and 
the misconduct is an insidious frustration of a constitutional 
guarantee, that of the equal protection of the laws.  
2. Deterrence 
Deterrence, unlike retributive punishment, justifies the 
imposition of punitive damages based on an incentives scheme. 
Punitive damages force would-be defendants to internalize the 
costs of their wrongful actions and thereby incentivizes social 
responsibility.135 The optimal amount of deterrence is achieved by 
a damages award that forces “injurers . . . to pay for the harm their 
conduct generates, not less, not more.”136 Accordingly, punitive 
damages are most appropriate where the “probability of detection 
and successful suit for compensation” is low.137 Relatedly, the 
deterrence justification may support punitive damages where the 
harm is difficult to quantify.138 And, from a non-economic 
standpoint, scholars have called for punitive damages to deter 
defendants from deriving benefits where full compensatory 
 
 134. See id. at 2085–86 (“The retributive idea would probably focus on two principal 
factors: the defendant’s state of mind and the degree of harm actually caused or likely to be 
caused by the defendant’s behavior.” (emphasis added)). 
 135. Id. at 2082. 
 136. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998). 
 137. Sunstein et al., supra note 131, at 208; see also Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 
347 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that greater punitive damages awards are 
merited where “probability of detection is very low”). 
 138. See Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676–77 (“Compensatory damages w[ill] not do the  
trick . . . because they are difficult to determine in the case of acts that inflict largely  
dignitary harms. . . .”). 
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damages fail to negate the “hedonic” utility of socially  
harmful behavior.139  
Ideally the analysis would continue with empirical assessment of 
how effective compensatory damages are at deterring disparate 
impact violations and then inquiring as to the need for punitive 
damages to make up any difference. Such analysis is impossible, 
however, given the dearth of successful disparate impact claims.140 
But the absence of successful claims does not render the deterrence 
justification nugatory. First, the Court has not formally repudiated 
the disparate impact theory of Equal Protection Clause violations. 
Thus, there remains a claim through which punitive damages might, 
at least in theory, deter state action that results in a disparate impact. 
Second, in other contexts the Court has been willing to call into 
question state actors’ intent with at least a variant of the analysis 
described in Feeney.141 So it remains possible that through some 
combination of direct evidence of discriminatory purpose and a 
willing court, a disparate impact plaintiff may yet be successful.  
Proceeding on theory then, the deterrence purpose behind 
punitive damages applies with force to disparate impact violations 
given their non-facially classificatory nature. By definition, a 
disparate impact is not on the face of the government action. 
Individuals who are disparately impacted must first determine 
whether their adversity is due to the facially neutral reason—a low 
test score, lack of military status—or their demographic group—
black, female. Then once plaintiffs, these individuals must prove 
that the state action was taken with the intention of disabling their 
demographic group. This surreptitious working of the disparate 
impact and the difficulty in proving it are the very factors giving 
 
 139. Sunstein et al., supra note 131, at 2083; see also Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677 (finding 
punitive damages may be necessary “because to limit the plaintiff to compensatory damages 
would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity provided that he was 
willing to pay . . . .”). 
 140. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 141. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–31 (2018) 
(scrutinizing hearing statements from members of a state adjudicatory entity for evidence of 
a lack of “neutral and respectful consideration” despite the existence of a facially neutral 
ruling). 
6.STEWART_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  2/9/2021  9:23 PM 




rise to the low “probability of detection and successful suit” that 
demand the deterrent effect of punitive damages.142  
Disparate impact claims are also not wanting with respect to the 
other deterrence considerations. The dignitary harm of being the 
subject of discrimination is not easy to quantify, even where the 
economic harm of that discrimination might be. This is all the more 
where the discrimination has been so intentionally wrought by 
subterfuge. Disparately impacted individuals are left to 
simultaneously suffer the discrimination and the indignity that the 
state is so intent upon discriminating that it has attempted to 
achieve by stealth what it is forbidden to do directly. The message 
sent to the disparately impacted individual is that the state will 
employ whatever means it can to treat that individual inequitably. 
The difficulty of measuring the harm such a message inflicts augurs 
in favor of awarding punitive damages, as does the need to prevent 
the state from deriving utility from flouting the Constitution with 
impunity while only having to pay a lesser price. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The equal protection principle stands in tension with the states’ 
general police power to regulate their citizens. And the equal 
protection principle sweeps broadly, encompassing, in the first 
instance, all state action. Disparate impact theories of Equal 
Protection Clause violations take things even further, potentially 
imposing a second layer of review. The first scrutinizes state action 
on its face, the second scrutinizes state action in its effects. It is 
unsurprising that the Court, in deference to the states’ status as 
sovereigns, has restrained the fullest reach of the equal protection 
principle through the discriminatory purpose standard.  
In so limiting the scope of the equal protection principle the 
Court has created a safe harbor for two categories of states. The first 
category includes the states that create a disparate impact 
spontaneously, solely by dint of the state action’s operation. The 
second includes the states that create a disparate impact intentionally 
 
 142. That no disparate impact claims since Feeney have met the discriminatory purpose 
standard also suggests the claims have at least a low probability of successful suit. Although, 
in this circumstance, the low probability owes largely to the Court’s jurisprudence rather 
than the nature of the state’s conduct. 
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but possess the minimum competence necessary to hide that intent. 
States belonging to either category wreak real-world harm. Indeed, 
police shootings and killings of non-violent, unarmed black 
individuals—a pressingly salient topic143—can probably be 
understood in terms of ostensibly neutral law enforcement regimes 
that disparately impact black communities. A state belonging to 
either of the above safe harbor categories could cause such a 
disparate impact and still avoid equal protection liability.  
Congress, while not capable of disturbing the safe harbor, could 
authorize a punitive damages remedy in order to accomplish a 
variety of ends—reinforce the boundary between permissible and 
illegitimate state action, signal to the states that Congress is mindful 
of how they are treating their populations, or ensure a deserved 
punishment for constitutional violations. Regardless of Congress’s 
goal, the Court’s heightening of the disparate impact plaintiff’s 
burden made disparate impact claims meritorious of punitive 
damages. As this Note has shown, Congress should consider itself 
justified to use its § 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
complement the Court’s raising of the bar for disparate impact 
plaintiffs by providing a punitive award for these plaintiffs.  
 
 143.  Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the 
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html. 
